Librería Portfolio

Investigates the boundaries of firms and the effect of these boundaries on economics performance
Takes a property rights approach to incomplete contracting ideas and economic modeling
Blends together research from economics, finance, industrial organization, management, and political science




The 1986 article by Grossman and Hart ´A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration ´ has provided a framework for understanding how firm boundaries are defined and how they affect economic performance. The property rights approach has provided a formal way to introduce incomplete contracting ideas into economic modeling.

The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics collects papers and opinion pieces on the impact that this property right approach to the firm has had on the economics profession. It shows that the impact has been felt sometimes in significant ways in a variety of fields, ranging from the theory of the firm and their internal organization to industrial organization, international trade, finance, management, public economy, and political economy and political science. Beyond acknowledging how the property rights approach has permeated economics as a whole, the contributions in the book also highlight the road ahead--how the paradigm may change the way research is performed in some of the fields, and what type of research is still missing. The book concludes with a discussion of the foundations of the property rights, and more generally the incomplete contracting, approaches and with a series of contributions showing how behavioral considerations may provide a new way forward.



Table of Contents

PART 1: Perspectives on Grossman and Hart 1986
(1) Introductory Remarks on Grossman and Hart, JPE, 1986
John Moore (University of Edinburgh)
(2) Grossman-Hart (1986) as a Theory of Markets
Bengt Holmström (MIT)
(3) Remarks on Incomplete Contracting
Jean Tirole (Toulouse School of Economics)
(4) Property Rights and Transaction Cost Theories
Steven Tadelis (University of California-Berkeley and eBay Research Labs)
(5) Grossman and Hart (1986) and Applied Theory
Thomas Hubbard (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University)
PART 2: Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries
(6) Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries: New Directions
Wouter Dessein (Columbia University)
(7) Discussion of Wouter Dessein´s ´Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries: New Directions ´
Francine Lafontaine (University of Michigan)
(8) Comment on ´Incomplete contracts and Firm Boundaries: New Directions ´ by Wouter Dessein
Michael D. Whinston (MIT)
PART 3: Incomplete Contracts and Internal Organization
(9) Incomplete Contracts and the Internal Organization of Firms
Phillipe Aghion (Harvard University), Nicholas Bloom (Stanford University), John Van Reenen (London School of Economics)
(10) Comments on Aghion, Bloom and Van Reenen ´Incomplete Contracts and the Internal Organization of Firms, ´ P.
John Roberts (Stanford University)
(11) The Empirical Implications of the Grossman-Hart Model: Comments on ´Incomplete Contracts an the Internal Organization of Firms, ´ by P. Aghion, N. Bloom and J. Van Reenen
W. Bentley McLeod (Columbia University)
PART 4: Incomplete Contracts and Corporate Finance
(12) Corporate Finance, Incomplete Contracts, and Corporate Control
Patrick Bolton (Columbia University)
(13) Discussion of Patrick Bolton´s ´Corporate Finance, Incomplete Contracts, and Corporate Control ´
Efraim Benmelech (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University)
(14) Why Incomplete Contract is Important for Finance
Luigi Zingales (The University of Chicago Booth School of Business)
PART 5: Incomplete Contracts and Business Firms
(15) Oliver Hart´s Contributions to the Understanding of Strategic Alliances and Technology Licensing
Josh Lerner (Harvard University)
(16) Incomplete Contracts and Venture Capital
Steve Kaplan (The University of Chicago Booth School of Business)
(17) Incomplete Contracts and the Role of Small Firms
Jeremy C. Stein (Harvard University)
PART 6: Incomplete Contracts and Industrial Organization
(18) Contracts, Ownership and Industrial Organization: Past and Future
Patrick Legros (Université libre de Bruxelles) and Andrew F. Newman (Boston University)
(19) Discussion of ´Contracts, Ownership and Industrial Organization: Past and Future ´, by Patrick Legros and Andrew Newman
Mathias Dewatripont (Université libre de Bruxelles and National Bank of Belgium)
(20) Discussion of ´Contracts, Ownership and Industrial Organization: Past and Future ´, by Patrick Legros and Andrew Newman
Kai-Uwe Kühn (University of Michigan)
PART 7: Incomplete Contracts and International Trade
(21) Grossman-Hart (1986) Goes Global: Incomplete Contracts, Property Rights, and the International Organization of Production
Pol Antràs (Harvard University)
(22) Comment on Pol Antràs: ´Grossman-Hart (1986) Goes Global: Incomplete Contracts, Property Rights, and the International Organization of Production ´
Elhanan Helpman (Harvard University)
(23) The Theory of the Firm Goes Global
Dalia Marin (University of Munich)
PART 8: Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership
(24) Incomplete Contracts and Not for Profit Firms
Paul Grout (University of Bristol)
(25) Firm Ownership: The Legacy of Grossman and Hart
Henry Hansmann (Yale Law School)
(26) Ex-Ante Anonymity and Government Allocation of Property Rights
Rohan Pitchford (Australian National University)
PART 9: Incomplete Contracts and Political Economy
(27) International Treaties as Incomplete Contracts
Bård Harstad (University of Oslo)
(28) Incomplete Contracts and Political Economy
Gerard Roland (University of Berkeley)
(29) Incomplete Contracts and the Design of Constitutions
Guido Tabellini (Bocconi University)
PART 10: Incomplete Contracts, Mechanism Design and Complexity
(30) Comments on the Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
Eric Maskin (Harvard University)
(31) Comments on the Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
John Moore (University of Edinburgh)
(32) Incomplete Contracts and Mechanism Design
Richard Holden (University of New South Wales)
(33) Complexity and Undescribability
Nabil I. Al-Najjar (Nothwestern University), Luca Anderlini (Georgetown University), and Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics)
PART 11: Incomplete Contracts, Reference Points and Communication
(34) New Directions of Incomplete Contracts: Reference Points, Communication, and Renegotiation
Christian Zehnder (University of Lausanne)
(35) Some Recent Experimental Evidence on Contracts as Reference Points
Klaus Schmidt (University of Munich)
(36) Incomplete Contracting in the Field
Antoinette Schoar (Harvard University)